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Gary Chartier’s book, Anarchy and Legal Order (2013), makes a significant 
contribution to four distinct, albeit overlapping fields: natural law theory, 
libertarian and anarchist theory, philosophy of law and political philosophy. It 
builds on Chartier’s previous work in a series of books and articles exploring 
issues in natural law, anarchism and economic justice.1 The book is 
unconventional not only in defending market anarchism from a leftist 
perspective, but also for doing so within a natural law ethical framework. As a 
natural law theorist with market anarchist leanings, I am more sympathetic than 
many readers will be to Chartier’s project. However, the unconventional nature 
of the arguments is part of the work’s appeal.  
Chartier’s book uses the resources of the natural law tradition in ethics 
to defend a vision of law without the state. It therefore presents a theory of 
what might be termed natural law anarchism. Some readers may find this 
combination of views surprising. The most prominent contemporary defender 
of natural law ideas, John Finnis, heavily emphasizes the role of state 
institutions (1980).2 However, Finnis’s theory arguably gives a misleading 
picture of the relationship between natural law and the state. Natural law theory 
is, in fact, highly hospitable to anarchism. I wish to begin by drawing this out, 
since it helps put Chartier’s project in context. I will then look in more detail at 
some features of Chartier’s account. 
 
Natural Law and the State 
 
The natural law tradition in ethics, politics and jurisprudence is highly 
diverse. However, the most influential recent strand of natural law thinking is 
probably the “new natural law theory” associated with authors such as Finnis, 
Germain Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle.3 Chartier situates his project within this 
broad school of thought (2013: 7), although he differs from the authors 
mentioned above on a range of specific issues. The most notable of these 
divergences, given the focus of Chartier’s book, is his rejection of the statist 
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orientation of the new natural law thinkers. It seems to me, however, that 
Chartier’s anarchism is in many ways more consistent with the new natural law 
framework than the statist outlook of its leading proponents. 
It will be useful to say something here about the core claims of the new 
natural law theory.4 The core claims of the new natural law ethics are perhaps 
best encapsulated by two fundamental ideas: first, the plurality of both the basic 
forms of good and the associated principles of practical reasoning; and, second, 
the logical priority of the good over the right. The natural law claim that there 
is a plurality of basic, incommensurable goods entails the rejection of 
consequentialism. Consequentialism makes practical reasoning seem like an 
exercise in calculation: once we have reduced the consequences of each action 
down to a single metric, we can compare them and see which is preferable. 
However, natural law ethics denies that it is possible to evaluate all our actions 
in terms of one overarching metric. Different actions may promote different 
goods; in many cases, there is no objective way of weighing them up. 
The new natural law theorists therefore view maximizing as an improper 
and, indeed, senseless attitude to apply to the basic goods. It makes no sense to 
say that people have a duty to maximize the total amount of good in their lives. 
Rather, people have a duty to both participate in and show respect for the basic 
goods in their actions. The new natural law approach to political theory, 
meanwhile, emphasizes the notion of the common good. The common good 
refers to a state of affairs where all members of the community are able to 
participate in the basic goods in a range of reasonable ways. The duty each 
person has to show respect for the basic goods entails a duty to do one’s share 
for the common good. This involves maintaining a community structure where 
everyone can pursue the good in their own lives.  
Legal rules and institutions play a twofold role in maintaining the 
common good.5 Some laws reproduce the requirements of practical rationality. 
These laws simply reiterate the duties people have to show respect for the basic 
goods by refraining from wrongful actions, such as murder. Other laws are 
specifications of practical rationality: they stipulate details of social life that the 
natural law leaves indeterminate. There are at least some areas of social life 
where practical rationality does not stipulate a particular form of conduct, but 
where a shared rule may be necessary for coordination. Road use is a classic 
case: practical rationality does not tell us whether to drive on the right- or left-
hand side of the road, but unless one rule is adopted across the community, 
many people’s interests will be thwarted. Law can therefore play an important 
social coordination function by stipulating what shared rules community 
members should follow. 
There is nothing in the new natural law framework, as outlined above, 
that entails a central role for state institutions. The common good involves 
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maintaining a community structure where everyone can pursue the basic goods, 
but it is an open question whether this arrangement is best achieved through 
the state. There might, indeed, be good reason to think that a stateless society 
will enable its members to pursue the basic goods more fully than one in which 
the state plays a central role. Institutions such as families and cooperative 
organizations may be better suited than the state to nurturing the well being of 
individual agents. Indeed, the natural law tradition has long given a central 
place to the notion of subsidiarity, which suggests that the common good is 
best understood and pursued at a local level.    
Natural law theorists such as Finnis, however, have nonetheless thought 
that the state is essential for upholding the role of law in the natural law picture. 
Law, as we have seen, plays an important coordinating role for the new natural 
law theorists. Finnis argues that this role can only be fulfilled if law acts as a 
centralized source of social authority. He claims that social coordination 
requires “unanimity or authority. There are no other choices” (1980: 232). It is 
impractical, he argues, to secure unanimous consent on the types of complex 
coordination problems that arise in a large community. Legal authority is 
therefore necessary to solve these difficulties. This implies a role for the state in 
imposing legal solutions. 
Finnis’s reasoning here is highly suspect. The main problem with his 
argument is that it overlooks the central role of social conventions in solving 
coordination problems. Many social coordination problems—including 
extremely complex ones—are solved by convention, rather than authority. 
Languages, for example, are complex sets of conventions that have evolved in 
response to the need for society-wide standards of communication. They work 
well, even though nobody planned them. It is arguable that many other social 
coordination problems could be solved by convention in the absence of a 
centralized legal authority. This would result, if not in unanimity, then in 
something functionally very similar.  
The availability of convention as a mode of solving such problems raises 
the possibility that Finnis is overconfident in his endorsement of legal 
authority. However, it is possible to take this point one step further. The 
central role of social conventions in solving coordination problems has the 
potential to actively undermine state authority. Consider the hypothetical case 
of Thomas Street, where the legal speed limit is 50 kilometres per hour (km/h) 
(Crowe 2007: 787-8). However, in practice, almost everyone drives on that 
street at a speed of 70 km/h. In those circumstances, the best course for 
motorists on Thomas Street may well be to drive at the faster speed, since it is 
generally safer to drive at the same speed as other road users.6 In other words, 
drivers on Thomas Street fare better by following the speed adopted by other 
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drivers, than they would by regarding the state mandated traffic regulations as 
authoritative.  
There is a deeper point to this example. Legal rules gain their moral 
force not from their legal status, per se, but from their status as a salient 
response to a social coordination problem. Some state laws go well beyond 
what is required for effective social coordination and others—such as the legal 
speed limit on Thomas Street—do not correspond to salient social norms. 
Finnis thinks there is good reason for people to respond to social coordination 
problems by adopting the state mandated solution as authoritative. However, it 
is far from obvious that such an attitude is better adapted to the demands of 
the common good than an approach that favors emergent orders of the type 
that would govern a stateless society. 
 
Ethical Foundations 
 
Chartier’s book begins by summarizing his preferred view of natural law 
ethics. This is well done, as it was in Chartier’s previous book on Economic Justice 
and Natural Law (2009). Chartier places significant stress on the new natural law 
view that there is a plurality of basic goods that cannot be reduced to a single 
metric. Human welfare, for Chartier, is pluriform (2013: 15). Furthermore, the 
basic goods that figure in an account of human welfare are incommensurable.  
Chartier means by this not only that the goods are irreducible (in the sense that 
they cannot be reduced to a single equation), but also that they are incomparable 
(they cannot meaningfully be compared or weighed when engaging in practical 
reasoning) (2013: 21-3). 
Chartier’s account of incommensurability here strikes me as too strong. 
Even if we grant that there is a plurality of basic forms of good and that these 
basic goods are irreducible to a single metric, this does not necessarily mean 
that the goods cannot be objectively weighed against each other in at least 
some cases. Some decisions to prioritize one kind of good over another simply 
reflect individual commitments. However, others seem to reflect objective 
priorities between different kinds of value. Suppose I am watching a rerun of 
Friends when my best friend calls me in distress and says she needs to talk. It 
seems like I should stop watching trashy television and help my friend. 
Furthermore, it seems plausible that it would be objectively wrong not to do so. 
Each option may contain a different form of value, but these values are 
sufficiently comparable to say which should objectively prevail. 
I suspect Chartier would deny that there is any objective hierarchy 
between these options. It would be wrong for me to neglect my friend, he 
might say, because I have made a personal commitment to her by virtue our 
friendship. It is this commitment, not the intrinsic attributes of the situation, 
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that dictates my response. This analysis does not strike me as obviously wrong, 
but I still think the better way to account for the situation is to say that close 
friendships are objectively more valuable than certain other forms of 
enjoyment. Chartier’s strong version of the incommensurability thesis is unable 
to accommodate this analysis. It therefore seems better to say that the basic 
goods are irreducible, but not always incomparable.  
Chartier also accepts the standard new natural law view that the 
prohibition on directly harming basic aspects of welfare is absolute and 
exceptionless (2013: 34). It is always wrong to purposefully harm a person, 
such as by killing or injuring her. The potential difficulty this causes for cases 
like self-defense is then dealt with using a version of the doctrine of double 
effect (DDE) (2013: 37-8). This is, as I said, the orthodox new natural law 
analysis. However, my own view is that strained reasoning can be avoided by 
acknowledging that the prohibition on directly harming basic goods is highly 
stringent, but less than absolute. This does not dispense with DDE, but it 
lessens the burden it has to bear.7 I do not really see what Chartier has to gain 
by characterizing the principle of respect as absolute, rather than merely highly 
stringent. It may indeed strengthen the overall appeal of his ethical framework 
to weaken this claim.  
Chartier then uses the natural law ethical framework described above to 
set up a robust ethical presumption against aggression towards persons and 
their justly acquired property. Specifically, aggression against bodies is said to 
be absolutely prohibited, while aggression against property is presumptively 
ruled out. Chartier’s discussion of bodily aggression trades on the absolute 
nature of the prohibition on directly harming others (2013: 46), but again I 
think this principle would be more plausible if treated as merely highly 
stringent. The treatment of property rights in Chartier’s book is nuanced and 
persuasive (2013: 49-88). He argues persuasively that a range of diverse 
desiderata support recognition of a set of baseline rules protecting just 
possessory claims to material property. I admired Chartier’s earlier analysis of 
property rights in Economic Justice and Natural Law (2009) and here he refines his 
theory further.  
I am in print agreeing with Chartier’s critique of the traditional natural 
law position denying the rights of animals (Crowe 2011b: 11-12; 2013: ch. 4). 
He repeats his argument here, with previously unpublished elaborations, and 
integrates it into his wider project (2013: 93-108). Chartier contends that non-
human animals participate in forms of flourishing sufficiently similar to those 
enjoyed by humans to support claims to fundamental rights. He rightly 
criticizes other proponents of the new natural law theory, such as Finnis, for 
the poverty of their arguments concerning non-human animals. I was slightly 
less sure, however, about Chartier’s view that animals can never be the subject 
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of just possessory claims. Chartier argues that animals should never be enslaved 
and, as such, should never be treated as possessions. However, it is not clear 
that exercising a possessory claim over an animal necessarily enslaves it.  
The fact that it is wrong to threaten basic aspects of animal welfare does 
not necessarily show that it is wrong to keep and use animals, provided their 
rights are respected. This would allow room for limited possessory claims over 
animals. As Chartier recognizes, all possessory claims are limited in any case 
(2013: 132-53). The question here therefore seems to be what the best way is of 
protecting animal rights. It may well be that Chartier is correct in highlighting 
the potential role for animal advocates and the homesteading of animals’ legal 
claims. However, it seems at least possible that allowing limited possessory 
claims over animals might turn out to be an equally effective way to protect 
their interests in at least some cases. 
Chartier notes that he does not mean his comments to rule out 
“interdependent companion relationships” between humans and non-human 
animals (2013: 107). He acknowledges my criticisms in a footnote and concedes 
that it may sometimes be permissible to keep and use animals if this does not 
threaten their well being (2013: 107 n. 82). He still seems to maintain, however, 
that this should not be done through possessory claims. At any rate, it is hard 
to disagree with Chartier that many of the ways animals are currently treated 
under cover of possessory claims are morally repugnant. He is clearly right that 
the moral limits that the rights of animals place on our possessory claims need 
to be taken more seriously. 
 
Anarchy Under Law 
 
Chartier utilizes the ethical framework outlined above to make the case 
for a stateless society. He argues that the common good rests crucially on 
peaceful, voluntary cooperation. He then contends that the state is not needed 
to foster such cooperation and, in fact, often tends to seriously impede it. 
There is much to admire in this account. Chartier’s painstaking description of 
the various ways in which the state poses a danger to peaceful, voluntary and 
equal social cooperation is particularly valuable (2013: 208-32). I will not dwell 
here, though, on this aspect of the argument. Instead, I wish to focus on what 
Chartier says about law.  
There is an unfortunate dearth of literature on the implications of 
anarchism in jurisprudence, certainly compared to the relatively robust 
literature in political philosophy. Chartier makes an important contribution to 
this field.8 He offers a rich and detailed discussion of the nature of law in a 
stateless society. Chartier rightly notes that a stateless society would give rise to 
a pluralistic system featuring multiple legal regimes. He makes the important 
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point that while legal mechanisms in a stateless society would have multiple 
sources and contents, they could nonetheless be expected to exhibit common 
features (2013: 244-8). There would not be complete uniformity, but there 
would be convergence across regimes.  
This point is important because it illustrates how non-state law could be 
expected to exhibit the virtues of pluralism and flexibility, without undermining 
the emergence of shared norms and expectations within a community. This 
picture shows how non-state law has the capacity to play the coordinating role 
given to law in natural law jurisprudence, while avoiding the moral and social 
hazards associated with the coercive apparatus of the state. An anarchist 
conception of law, in other words, offers the promise of legal obligation 
without recourse to state authority. It reveals the crucial oversight in Finnis’s 
argument that that social coordination requires “unanimity or authority” and 
no other options are possible (1980: 232). 
My main quibble with the way Chartier presents this material is that 
more attention could have been given to the way in which legal principles 
reflect a form of spontaneous order, as discussed by authors like F. A. Hayek.9 
Hayek’s account of the development of the common law in works such as Law, 
Legislation and Liberty provides a rich picture of how legal norms can come to 
exhibit coherence without being imposed from above (1982: vol. 1, ch. 4-6). 
Hayek was not writing here specifically about how legal norms might develop 
in a polycentric legal order, but his emphasis on legal reasoning as a form of 
emergent order has fruitful application in that context. A rich account of the 
basis of customary legal norms can also be found in Garrett Barden and Tim 
Murphy’s recent book, Law and Justice in Community (2010).10 
An evolutionary perspective such as that presented by Hayek could also 
help to support Chartier’s account of how outlaws could legitimately be subject 
to enforcement of clearly just legal principles (2013: 257-60). A partial answer 
to this challenge, as Chartier acknowledges (2013: 260), might be that even in a 
polycentric legal order a type of ius gentium comprising the basic principles 
common to all legal regimes might be expected to emerge over time. These 
shared principles might emerge partly through deliberate copying between legal 
codes, but could also be expected to emerge organically through the decisions 
of arbitrators, creating a common law in the Hayekian sense. This would also 
partially stave off worries about legal regimes overreaching and subjecting 
outlaws to coercive enforcement of rules falling outside the realm of clearly just 
basic principles. The likely convergence of legal regimes in a stateless society is, 
for these reasons, an important point for anarchist legal theories to emphasise. 
Chartier goes on to discuss methods for rectifying injuries in a stateless 
society. In particular, he presents compelling and challenging arguments as to 
why such a society would not recognize the category of crime (2013: 264-5), 
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relying instead on restitution for harms. He rightly emphasizes the danger that 
the category of crimes against the state may become divorced from actual 
harms to members of the community. The category of crime is meant to 
protect society from violence, but in practice the criminal law often does 
violence against vulnerable members of the community and thereby 
perpetuates social inequality.  
Any proposal to remove the category of crime and focus on 
compensable harms already constitutes a reduction in the kinds of behavior 
that may be prosecuted under law. Chartier wishes to go further, arguing that 
no liability should accrue based on purely communicative acts (2013: 274-8) or 
damage to reputation (2013: 278-9). I wondered, though, if it is necessary to be 
so austere about the categories of harm recognized by law. Expression of 
attitudes, after all, can directly cause harmful acts. More broadly, it can spread 
attitudes that cause harm.11 The common law of defamation has long 
recognized that compensation is sometimes due for damage to reputation. 
There is a Hayekian case for not radically reordering these evolved principles, 
but rather taking advantage of the knowledge process that produced them. The 
focus would instead be on avoiding legal distortions produced by central 
planning and state regulation. This would, perhaps, be another direction an 
anarchist theory of law might take. 
Chartier’s analysis of the cultural and political benefits of a stateless 
society is extremely useful. The discussion makes a number of important 
points. In particular, the distinction between political and cultural anarchism is 
very fruitful (2013: 323). Chartier makes it clear that anarchism is not limited to 
challenging state power, but also involves working to undermine social 
hierarchies and create a culture that values autonomy, openness and self-
expression. Anarchism is a political program in a broad sense: it is not 
concerned only with legal institutions, but also targets other community 
structures. Chartier provides a helpful outline of the different modes of 
political activism that contribute to this project (2013: 324-8). 
 This discussion of how politics is not exhausted by discourse about 
state institutions and how, in fact, eliminating the state could lead to more 
worthwhile political discourse has broader implications. Political discourse in 
modern Western democracies (as well as many other places) tends to be 
dominated by state institutions and officials. Media reports of current issues 
tend to be heavily skewed to what government representatives or their rivals 
within the state sanctioned political process have said about the issue at hand. 
The question of why we should care so much about what these people have to 
say compared to the opinions of others in the community is rarely directly 
confronted. The answer is surely that we only care what they say because they 
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have seized coercive power to direct our actions and shape the social order. 
Chartier’s discussion makes it commendably clear why this power is illegitimate.   
The final chapter of Chartier’s book situates his project by framing it as a 
leftist, anti-capitalist and socialist agenda. The chapter is likely to be of most 
interest to those who have a pre-existing stake in those terms. The most useful 
part of the chapter for me was the discussion of different senses of 
“capitalism” and why advocates of freed markets should reject the term (2013: 
386-97). I had occasional doubts about the importance of this chapter, given it 
could be seen as concerned with terminological issues. However, it helps put 
Chartier’s anarchist project into historical context. Furthermore, the chapter 
performs a useful role by breaking down ideological preconceptions about the 
meaning of the terms discussed. The chapter, like Chartier’s book as a whole, 
challenges prevailing orthodoxies and therefore undermines existing 
hierarchies. There is a clear sense in which Chartier’s whole project in the book 
is an exercise in anarchist political activism as he defines it. It would be good if 
more political and legal philosophy engaged underlying social and political 
assumptions in this kind of fashion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I argued at the start of this article that the new natural law framework is 
more hospitable to anarchism than it might initially appear from the arguments 
of authors such as Finnis. The new natural law emphasis on subsidiarity and 
social coordination opens the way for a picture of law where voluntary 
associations and emergent legal orders play a central role. It is, at least, an open 
question whether state institutions represent the best way of promoting the 
common good. Indeed, the tendency of state institutions to crowd out more 
effective social solutions to coordination problems suggests that the common 
good may be better pursued without them. All this provides fertile ground for 
natural law anarchism.  
Anarchy and Legal Order brings together the natural law and anarchist 
traditions in ways that are illuminating for both. One can only hope that 
authors operating in one of these traditions and not the other will not be 
deterred from engaging with Chartier’s arguments. Chartier’s work is ambitious, 
as I noted previously, not only in the variety of topics covered, but also in the 
radical character of its political vision and the way it attempts to break down 
entrenched disciplinary and ideological boundaries. I applaud its ambition and 
think it generally succeeds in its aims. The book is original, insightful and 
closely argued. It will help to cement Chartier’s growing reputation as a leader 
in natural law and anarchist thought. 
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Notes 
                                                          
* Associate Professor, T. C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland. 
 
1 See, for example, Chartier (2009; 2011). 
 
2 For critical discussion, see Crowe (2011a; 2011b). 
 
3 See, for example, Finnis (1980); Grisez (1983); Grisez, Boyle and Finnis (1987a); Grisez, Boyle and 
Finnis (1987b). 
 
4 For a more detailed discussion, see Crowe (2011a). See also Crowe (2012a). 
 
5 This basic insight can be traced back to Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I–II, q 95, art 2. 
 
6 I assume there are no other features of the road that make it clearly unsafe to drive at 70 km/h. 
 
7 For further discussion, see Crowe (2012b: 166-8). 
 
8 For my own modest contribution, see Crowe (2014). 
 
9 Chartier acknowledges this point in a footnote. See Chartier (2013: 248 n. 6). 
 
10 For a review, see Crowe (2012c). 
 
11 See, for example, MacKinnon and Dworkin (1998). 
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